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European jurists frequently distinguish between three models or systems of church-state relations: state church systems, separation (secular) systems, and cooperationist (hybrid) systems. 3 At first glance, this tripartite distinction seems to be both apt and constructive. State church systems are those countries characterised by the existence of close links between the state and a particular religious community, which may be styled as a 'state,' 'national,' 'established,' or 'folk' church. Examples include England, Denmark, Greece, Finland, Malta, and
Bulgaria. By contrast, separation systems include those countries where there is a constitutional barrier forbidding the financial support and establishment of any one religion. Examples of such a separation are France (with the exception of the three eastern départements), the Netherlands, and Ireland. Hybrid systems, effectively, are those states whose constitutional provisions concerning religion come in between state church systems and separation systems. Also known as cooperationist systems or sometimes concordatarian systems, these states are characterised by a simple separation of state and church coupled with the recognition of a multitude of common tasks which link state and church activity, which are often recognised in the form of agreements, treaties, and Concordats. Examples include Spain, Italy, Germany, Belgium, Austria, Hungary, Portugal, and the Baltic States.
However, further examination reveals that these models are flawed. 4 The state church categorisation often has more to do with theory than practice; with history rather than sociology. Although it is true that those countries labelled under this heading have in common the fact that they grant one religious community (or more) a special constitutional position and special benefits and burdens resulting from that special position, it may be observed that Eu- is not a corporate body, has very little in common with the Greek Orthodox Church which has its own legal status as a legal person and where the self-government of the church is guaranteed by the Greek constitution. This heterogeneity is underlined by the case of Finland which has two churches treated favourably by the state: the status of the Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Church is analogous to that of the Orthodox Church in Greece; while the status of the Finnish Orthodox Church, the country's second largest religious community, is not dissimilar to that of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Denmark. 5 Perhaps more problematic is the state church categorisation's failure to accommodate those states where although there was formerly a state church, that legal status has been removed but some special bond still exists.
Sweden and Wales are invariably omitted from the legal typologies entirely. 6 These considerations cast doubt upon the usefulness of the distinction.
An even more compelling criticism is that the focus upon the relationship between the state and one religious group (or in the case of Finland, two groups) does not paint an accurate picture of the legal regulation of religion in those countries. For example, the fact that England has a state church system says very little about the legal regulation of religion in England. Indeed, the most recent and authoritative House of Lords judgment concerning the position of the Church of England seemed to suggest that there was some distance between the established church and the state. In Aston Cantlow v Wallbank 7 Lord Hope of Craighead noted that " [t] he relationship which the state has with the Church of England is one of recognition, not of the devolution to it of any of the powers or functions of government." Moreover, 5 Sandberg & Doe, "Church-State Relations in Europe." 6 Robbers, "State and Church in the European Union," 578-581. Post-print version of article subsequently published in (2008) common in relation to their treatment of religion than the constitutional letter may suggest.
It has been conceded that this tripartite distinction traditionally adopted by lawyers is seriously flawed. Robbers notes that this classification "according to legal and theoretical considerations is constantly overrated and rendered questionable by social circumstance which suggests different groupings." 26 In short, the three legal categories seem overly formu-laic. Although, the conventional legal approach has some benefits: as Monsma and Soper point out no country embodies any categorization "in a pure form, but by starting out with these models in mind will help to organize and focus the mass of observations" that can be made by studying each system, 27 it is difficult to disagree with the argument of Ferrari who
advocates that the tripartite system should be abandoned. 28 He laments what he perceives to be the "persistent recourse (to a large extent due to mental laziness) to an outmoded classification" that "grants excessive importance the formal element of the relationship between church and state" which "overlooks its legal substance." However, the question of whether there is a preferable approach remains unanswered.
A New Approach
To answer that question, it is necessary to determine the precise shortcoming of the current legal approach. It seems that the shortcoming is that the legal model focuses upon the means and ignores the end. It focuses exclusively upon the constitutional position of religion. Conventional legal scholarship in this field runs the risk of missing the point. There is a need for a shift in approach and method by those engaged in research into this area. Part of the problem is that, despite the growth in literature, little attention has been paid to the direction and content of law and religion scholarship itself. 29 To date, this area of study has defied categorisa- These points ring true for religion law: 'religion' certainly has meaning outside the legal domain: 'religion law' may thus be defined as the part of (national and international) law concerned with the recognition and regulation of certain religious relationships and the implications of such recognition.
Furthermore, Douglas' understanding of family law may assist an elucidation of religion law in three respects: first, she notes that although many different fields of law (such as tax law and housing law) impact upon family members and family life, these "peripheral laws" are not automatically regarded "as aspects of something called family law" but equally
should not be ignored since they interact with the body of family law. This may be useful in terms of constructing religion law: we may decide to distinguish between those areas which are core and which are peripheral. The status of asylum and immigration, for example, may be interesting in this respect. Second, Douglas points out that family law "has grown piecemeal 38 The only use of this term in the UK at the moment is the title for a website kept by a barrister named Neil Addison which mainly deals with human rights, discrimination law and criminal law affecting religion in England The same is true of religion and religion law, which as a result, should focus on the recognition and regulation of religion domestically and as an international human right.
This elucidation of 'religion law,' not to mention the wider elucidation of 'law and religion' as being the study of religion law and religious law, may help scholarship on churchstate relations move beyond the narrow focus upon the letter of constitutional texts epitomised by the model-based approach. It stresses the fact that a whole host of legal areas may have impact upon religious individuals and groups. Reference should be made not only to constitutional law but also to criminal law, discrimination law, property law, education law, family law, media law, medical law, prison law, and so on. Although it would be possible to identify other legal models, it seems that a fuller understanding of the socio-legal reality may be gained by use of an interdisciplinary approach.
As Banaker and Travers note, "interdisciplinary" work may be distinguished form "multidisciplinary" work in that whilst "multidisciplinary" work "juxtaposes several disciplines without any attempt to integrate or synthesise aspects of their knowledge," "interdisciplinary"
work requires "an ambition to understand and integrate aspects of two or several disciplinary perspectives into a single approach." 44 The study of laws on religion alone cannot adequately explain the complex relationship between religion, law, and society. An interdisciplinary endeavour combining insights from law and religion, the sociology of religion, and the sociolo- noted "the state's role as the neutral and impartial organiser of the exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs" was a "duty" that was "conducive to public order, religious harmony and tolerance in a democratic society."
As Norman Doe has argued, it is possible to speak of a "common law on religion" in Europe. 56 Ironically, under this approach, the third legal category of hybrid systems becomes the answer rather than the problem: legal writings on these systems illustrate common characteristics which are shared not only by the so-called hybrid systems but by the states of Europe in general. As an elementary observation, it may be noted that the European approach is characterised by the recognition of religious freedom and the autonomy of religious organisations.
Cooperation exists between the state and at least some religious groups and such partnerships may be formulated as being an 'informal' or 'quasi-concordatian.' 57 A basic level of neutrality, tolerance, and parity is common to the whole continent. No country has a 'strong' state church system where other religious groups are not tolerated and no country has a 'strong' separation system whereby the state is indifferent to religion and religious liberty. This multidisciplinary approach, using Davie's sociological account to inform legal scholarship and using law to verify her sociological claims is undoubtedly enlightening. This is especially so if the legal analysis extends beyond constitutional law. This requires a fuller understanding of the breadth, depth, and purpose of religion law. Douglas' definition of family law reveals that religion law can be conceived of as being concerned with two overlapping but separate questions, 58 namely: how religion is recognised and how religion is regulated. To date, it is only the second question that has aroused interest and then it has been in the important but narrow context of determining the extent to which religious difference is accommodated. Answers to the first question need to take into account the many and varied ways in which religious individuals and groups are recognised by law. Whilst this undoubtedly includes reference to laws directly concerning religion, such as constitutional provisions and registration law, it extends much further to include laws which simply affect religion, such as general public order legislation and the general criminal law, for instance. Moreover, answering the question of how religion is recognised by European states requires an interdisciplinary approach.
Processes by which religious groups and individual are recognised as such have legal, social, economic, and political effects. Recognising religion is "an exercise of power" which can have serious repercussions: 59 legal systems use explicit and implicit definitions of religion to determine which individuals and groups should be bestowed by legal advantages by virtue of the fact that they are 'religious' and thus benefit from legal and fiscal benefits. Legal defi- religions. This may be illustrated by the American case of United States v Kuch 64 where the claimant contended that she had a constitutional right to take drugs because it was part of her religion, the Neo-American Church where the sole duty of the faithful was to partake the 'sacraments'-marijuana and LSD. 65 The District Court used the definition of religion to exclude the claim, holding that Kuch had "totally failed" in her effort to establish that the group was a religion since her desire to use and take drugs of its own sake regardless of religious experience was the purpose. However, the definition of religion used in this manner is a blunt in- A 'filtering device' is a means by which a claim is excluded at the outset. It means that the right or claim is outside legal protection: the right or claim is denied legal protection. In its classical sense, where a filtering device is used there is then no need to look at the merits of the claim since the claim has fallen at the first hurdle.
64 288 F Supp 439 (1968) [US District Court]. 65 The church had a nationwide membership of 20,000 and was headed by "Chief Boo Hoo." The claimant contended that the 'religion' also included the member's "martyrdom record" (of arrests for drug use), a church symbol (the three-eyed frog), an official song ("Puff the Magic Dragon") and a church motto ("Victory over guidance, plans for the content of the Zone were altered as the Lambeth Group demanded that the Zone "reflect the beliefs, practices and values of the faith communities that constituted the committee" and be funded by the "right sort" of sponsors. The accepted sponsors themselves demanded that the "religious content of the Zone was not going to be watered down" and that "the story of Jesus would be told in an appropriate way and not be 'watered down' by the content reflecting 'other faiths.'" 80 The result was that the final content of the Zone mainly reflected this bias. According to Gilliat-Ray's research, the exception to this trend, those parts of the Zone concerned with spirituality as opposed to world religions, ironically but predictably, proved more popular.
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For Gilliat-Ray, theories of social closure provide a useful means of "evaluating the way in which 'interested parties' and dynamics of interest push action in certain directions, along certain tracks, thereby including some and excluding others." 82 In the case of the Dome's Zone, a number of often "unspoken" criteria was used as a means of inclusion/exclusion such as the size and historicity of the tradition in Britain, the ready availability of a "respectable" representative or spokesperson with an "established track-record of working successfully with Government and other faith communities," and the "time and resources to work for the government, more or less for free," 83 not to mention the needed "willingness to conspire with the Government's own particular and often unspoken terms and conditions 80 Other offers for sponsorship, such as one from a nightclub who claimed that dance was the religion of the new millennium were "rejected out of hand": Gilliat-Ray, "The Trouble with 'Inclusion,'" 467-468.
81 Gilliat-Ray, "The Trouble with 'Inclusion,'" 468.
82 Gilliat-Ray, "The Trouble with 'Inclusion,'" 469. 83 Members of the Lambeth Group were paid expenses but nothing more. for inclusion." 84 As Gilliat-Ray comments, "the Government operates with a particular 'world view' of religion and religions as being well-defined, orthodox, and clearly bounded entities";
this not only "hides the often divisive and 'messy' realities of religion" but also excludes the "religious activity that operates beyond the boundaries of institutions or organisations."
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Gilliat-Ray concluded that although "it might appear as though the boundaries of inclusion/exclusion in relation to religion in the public sphere in Britain are somehow fixed and impermeable," this is not so and that a historical approach shows that "boundaries separating the included from the excluded are points of continual negotiation and struggle." 86 The Faith
Zone provides just one example of "a 'field' of struggle around inclusion and legitimacy"; 87 other examples may be examined. Legal changes may provide case-studies of such changes.
88
Moreover, reference to non-legal case-studies may help to explain the direction of legal changes. As Gilliat-Ray noted, the "boundary points are contextually variable" in that "what counts as 'permitted' religion in British provisions differs from what was 'acceptably' religious at the dome." 89 Yet, general trends may be identified if an interdisciplinary approach is 84 Governmental talk of Britain's faith communities seeks to "present an image of unity and faith communities working together harmoniously. Intra-faith diversity and division is often overlooked": Gilliat-Ray, "The Trouble with 'Inclusion, [469] [470] This view was so powerful that even the Christian churches came across the "Government mindset" that the Zone had to be inclusive. This required "deals to be struck": for example, at one point, the Lambeth Group looked at the sayings of Jesus and determined which of them could be signed up to by all the faith groups. As a result, "social everyday things like 'Blessed are the meek' was included but any reference to the Trinity or the afterlife were excluded": Gilliat-Ray, "The Trouble with 'Inclusion,'" 471-472.
86 Gilliat-Ray, "The Trouble with 'Inclusion,'" 472. Building upon Billig's concept of Banal Nationalism, (Oxford: Sage, 1995), "banal religiosity" may be seen as being constantly perpetuated by everyday habits. Understood against the background of the current post-9/11
climate the concept of "banal religiosity" can be contrasted with fundamental religiosity in the same way as Billig contrasted banal nationalism with "hot nationalism" which occurs at time of "social disruption." In an age
where the 'otherness' of different religious traditions is stressed, "banal religiosity" may explain why almost 72% of adults in England and Wales described themselves as "Christian" in the 2001 census, despite plummeting levels of religious practice.
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